Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
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National Bureau of Economic Research
Research
Abstract: 'To investigate barriers to universal health insurance in developing countries, we designed a randomised experiment involving about 6,000 households in Indonesia who are subject to a government health insurance program with a weakly enforced mandate. Time-limited subsidies increased enrollment and attracted lower-cost enrolees, in part by reducing the strategic timing of enrolment to correspond with health needs. Registration assistance also increased enrolment, but increased attempted enrolment much more, as over one-half of households who attempted to enrol did not successfully do so. These findings underscore how weak administrative capacity can create important challenges in developing countries for achieving widespread coverage.'
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Science
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American Economic Association
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Health Affairs
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Ideas for India
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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Harvard Kennedy School of Government
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Nature
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Penguin Random House
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PNAS
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Ideas for India
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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EconPapers
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J-PAL
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American Economic Journal
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Nature
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Seuil Jeunesse
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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EconPapers
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Juggernaut Books
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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J-PAL
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New England Journal of Medicine AI
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Journal of Development Economics
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Hachette
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American Economic Association
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De Gruyter
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Oxford University Press
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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EconPapers
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Public Affair Books
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Seuil
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Seuil
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J-PAL
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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The MIT Press
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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VoxDev
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MIT Climate Grand Challenges